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The New Economy, characterized by dynamic, global and innovative mar-
kets, requires a new way to approach many economic issues and also a new
way to approach policymaking. This work will analyse a new approach toward
competition policy based on recent progress in the theory of market leaders and
discuss its implications with special reference to the markets in the New Econ-
omy, whose distinctive features, namely high ﬁxed costs of R&D, less relevand
marginal costs of production and network eﬀects, require a diﬀerent approach
from traditional markets. Close attention will be given to the software mar-
ket, whose market leader has been (and still is) the subject of the attention of
antitrust authorities around the world.
The work is organized as follows. In Section1 I will present a brief overview
of antitrust policy in US and EU and I will try to motivate the need for a new
approach to competition policy, especially for the markets in the New Economy.
Section 2 will survey traditional approaches to competition policy, while Section
3 will present the innovations associated with the theory of market leaders. Sec-
tion 4 will apply the new approach to general issues of abuse of dominance with
particular reference to the software market and to the Microsoft case. Section
5 will deal with bundling issues again with reference to the software market.
Sections 6 will move to competition for the markets and to interoperability is-
sues which are crucial for the dynamic markets of the New Economy. Section
7 concludes, while the Appendix contains some more technical results on the
behaviour of market leaders.
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11 Competition Policy in US and EU
In the United States the main federal antitrust statute is the Sherman Act of
1890, which was developed in reaction to the widespread growth of large scale
business trusts. Section 1 prohibits restraints of trade in general, while Section
2 deals with monopolization stating that:
“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monop-
olize any part of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony”
Enforcement is shared by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus-
tice and by the Federal Trade Commission. The current interpretation of US
antitrust law associates abusive conduct with predatory or anticompetitive ac-
tions having the speciﬁc intent to acquire, preserve or enhance monopoly power
distinguished from acquisition through a superior product, business acumen or
historical accident. It is generally accepted that an action is anticompetitive
when it harms consumers.
In Europe competition policy has a more recent history which is mostly
associated with the creation of the European Union and its coordination of
policies for the promotion of free competition in the internal market. The main
provisions of European Competition Law concerning abuse of dominance are
contained in the Article 82 of the Treaty of the European Communities which
states that:
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be pro-
hibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may
aﬀect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular,
consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or sell-
ing prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production,
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c)
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.”
This article (as Article 81 on horizontal and vertical agreements and the
Merger Regulation) is part of the law of each member state and is enforced
by the European Commission (in particular the Directorate General for Com-
petition) and by all the National Competition Authorities. The application of
EU competition law on abuse of dominance involves the ﬁnding of a dominance
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with excessive pricing or with exclusionary practices as predatory pricing, re-
bates, tying or bundling, exclusive dealing or refusal to supply. However, the
analysis of both dominance and abusive behaviour entails complex economic
considerations and is the subject of an on going process of revision. A recent
document, European Commission (2005), has proposed a new approach to ex-
clusionary abuses under Article 82 which gives an important indication as to
how the Commission may approach antitrust cases in the future. The purpose
of Article 82 is deﬁned as “the protection of competition on the market as a
means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an eﬃcient allocation
of resources”. This implies that antitrust should protect competition and not
competitors and be based on an economic approach aiming at the maximization
of consumer welfare and allocative eﬃciency rather than based on a legalistic
approach, something which appears much more in line with the US approach.
Many economists have pointed out the necessity of a closer focus on consumer
welfare in the implementation of competition policy with speciﬁc reference to
abuses of dominance. While antitrust legislation was written with this objective
in mind, its concrete application, especially within the post-Chicago approach,
has often been biased against market leaders and in defence of their competitors
rather than toward the defence of competition and of the interests of consumers.
The two objectives do not necessarily overlap. The development of the New
Economy, characterized by very dynamic and innovative markets, has increased
the pressure for a new approach, already somewhat developed in the United
States, but just in progress in the European Union.
A new approach to competition policy should be based on rigorous eco-
nomic analysis, from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. In an
important EU Report, Rey et al. (2005) emphasize this element in the antitrust
procedure: “a natural process would consist of asking the competition authority
to ﬁrst identify a consistent story of competitive harm, identifying the economic
theory or theories on which the story is based, as well as the facts which sup-
port the theory as opposed to competing theories. Next, the ﬁrm should have
the opportunity to present its defence, presumably to provide a counter-story
indicating that the practice in question is not anticompetitive, but is in fact
a legitimate, perhaps even pro-competitive business practice.” Moreover, any
theory of the market structure able to provide guidance in detecting abuses of
dominant positions should: 1) take into account the role and the strategies of
dominant ﬁrms; 2) describe the equilibrium outcomes taking into account the
role of barriers to entry and of ﬁxed costs of entry (which can endogenously
determine entry of competitors) and in function of the demand and supply con-
ditions; and 3) provide welfare comparisons under alternative set-ups.
In this paper I will try to argue that, while the Chicago school and the
post-Chicago approach failed to provide a uniﬁed framework which matches
t h e s er e q u i r e m e n t s ,t h et h e o r yo fm a r k e tl e a d e r sf o r m a l i z e df o ri n s t a n c ei nE t r o
(2004, 2006a,b) has provided a possible alternative. The general principle proved
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way, accommodating or predatory, in markets where the number of ﬁrms is
exogenous, while they always behave in an aggressive way when entry into the
market is endogenous, which should be the relevant case in many situations: in
these, a large market share of the market leader is a consequence of its aggressive
strategies and of the endogenous entry, and not the consequence of its market
power. Hence, markets with high concentration due to the presence of a market
leadership are perfectly consistent with eﬃciency. This has major implications
for competition policy: while the old approach to abuses of dominant positions
needs to verify dominance through structural indicators and the existence of a
certain abusive behaviour, we suggest that there is not a well founded reason
to associate high levels of concentration with market power and a consistent
approach to abuse of dominance would just need to verify the existence of harm
to consumers. Finally, notice that what matters is not only welfare of current
consumers but also that of future ones (see Rey et al., 2005). What the theory
of market leaders suggests on this matter, as shown in Etro (2004), is that the
dynamic gains in eﬃciency due to a leadership position in innovative markets
can be quite high as long as entry in the market for innovation is endogenous:
the leadership of a ﬁrm may persist because of its high incentives to invest in
R&D under the threat of entry; nevertheless, this should not be seen as a signal
of abusive conduct, but, oddly enough, as the result of competitive pressure.
The recent document of the European Commission (2005) has inspired a
wide debate on the proper aims and methods of antitrust policy in Europe.
While the aim of this proposal is to enhance consumer welfare and to protect
competition and not competitors, we have some concern that these principles
are not fully carried through into certain aspects of the analytic framework. As
of now, the approach of the European Commission appears partly in line with
outdated views, for instance when it stresses an excessive reliance on market
shares in determining dominance. The novel part on the eﬃciency defences
for dominant ﬁrms appears to be going in the right direction since it allows
otherwise abusive strategies if they create a net eﬃciency gain (which bene-
ﬁts consumers). Nevertheless, the eﬀectiveness of these rules in safeguarding
consumer welfare is weakened when it is stated that some ﬁrms are virtually
excluded from the possibility of an eﬃciency defence. In particular, a strange
concept of market position “approaching that of a monopoly” is introduced and
associated with market shares above 75%, something without any justiﬁcation in
economic theory: a ﬁrm is a monopoly or is not (in which case, its behaviour is
constrained by competitors), but it cannot be an “almost monopoly” or a “near
monopoly”. From an economic point of view, the real missing concept, which
deﬁnes ﬁrms with high market shares but not monopolizing the all market, is
that of a Stackelberg leader with endogenous entry, which is the subject of the
analysis of the theory of market leaders (see ICC, 2006, for a more extensive
discussion of such an approach).
42 Chicago and post-Chicago Approaches
In this section I am going to review the traditional approaches to antitrust policy
on abuse of dominance and start comparing them with the insights of the recent
theoretical attempts to build a comprehensive theory of market leadership and
competition policy. In our view, a fully ﬂedged model of the behaviour of market
leaders is a necessary toolkit for deriving implications for antitrust policy, but
it is not necessarily part of the endowment of the traditional theories.
The traditional “pre-Chicago” approach was mostly based on basic mod-
els of imperfect competition associating market power, high market shares and
abusive conduct with the typical behaviour of monopolists. Such a na¨ ıve view
has been challenged in the 60s and 70s by the “Chicago approach” whose main
merit has been to show that, when there are potential entrants in a given sector,
aggressive strategies that would be suspect, such as bundling, price discrimina-
tion and exclusive dealing, are not necessarily anti-competitive but may instead
h a v eas t r o n ge ﬃciency rationale. More recent theories, often associated with
the so-called “post-Chicago” approach, have however shown that in the presence
of pervasive market imperfections, the above strategies can be anti-competitive
because they are aimed at deterring entry in the short run and protect mo-
nopolistic rents in the long run. Broadly speaking, US antitrust authorities
have been highly inﬂuenced by all these approaches over time, while it is hard
to claim that the same is true of the EU antitrust authorities. As has recently
been pointed out by Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla (2004), “in Europe it has taken
longer for new developments in economic theory to aﬀect competition policy.
While U.S. antitrust has been inﬂuenced by Chicago school and post-Chicago
school theories, pre-Chicago school considerations still play a role in Europe,
albeit at times dressed up in post-Chicago clothing”.
I believe that these traditional approaches gave important insights into many
antitrust issues, but they failed to provide a complete understanding of the be-
haviour of market leaders. The Chicago approach limited most of its analysis
to either monopolistic or perfectly competitive markets, and in a few cases, to
markets characterized by a monopolist and a competitive fringe of potential
entrants. For instance, according to the Chicago school there is not such a
thing as predatory pricing, that is reducing prices below costs to induce exit
by the competitors so as to compensate the initial losses with future proﬁts:
if the incumbent can sustain such initial losses, also any other competitor can
do it as long as credit markets are properly working, hence predatory pricing
would not be eﬀective to start with. This approach failed to provide results
that were robust enough to withstand fully-ﬂedged game-theoretical analysis
of dynamic competition between incumbents and entrants. Somewhat related
with it are the theory of contestable markets of Baumol, Panzar and Willig
(1982) and the initial literature on entry deterrence associated with the socalled
Bain-Modigliani-Sylos Labini framework. However, even if the initial theoreti-
cal contributions took into consideration the eﬀects of entry on the behaviour
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work and were substantially limited to the case of competition with perfectly
substitutable goods and constant or decreasing marginal costs.
In the 80s and 90s, post-Chicago research studied more complex market
structures within a solid game-theoretic framework and introduced welfare con-
siderations so as to derive sound normative implications, which represents one of
the main contributions of this approach. However, in most cases, this literature
studied the behaviour of incumbent monopolists facing a single potential en-
trant. To cite the most famous works with strong relevance for antitrust issues,
this was the case of the Dixit (1980) model of entry deterrence, of the models by
Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) of predatory pricing,2
of those by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and by Bulow et al. (1985) of strategic
investment, of the Bonanno and Vickers (1988) model of vertical restraints, of
the Whinston (1990) model of bundling for entry deterrence purposes, and of
many other works, often based on analysis of Stackelberg duopolies (that is,
markets with one leader and one follower).3 Also most of the standard results
on the behaviour of incumbents in terms of pricing, R&D investments, quality
choices, vertical and horizontal diﬀe r e n t i a t i o na r ed e r i v e di nm o d e l so fS t a c k -
elberg duopoly, where the incumbent chooses its own strategies in competition
with a single entrant. While this analysis simpliﬁes the interaction between
incumbents and competitors, it can be highly misleading, since it assumes away
the possibility of endogenous entry, and hence limits its relevance to situations
where the incumbent has already an exogenous amount of market power.
It is not surprising that the results of the post-Chicago approach are sys-
tematically biased toward an anti-competitive role by incumbents: these engage
in aggressive pricing, threaten or undertake overinvestments in complementary
markets, impose exclusive dealing contracts, or bundle their goods with the sole
purpose of deterring competitor entry. Otherwise they engage in accommo-
dating pricing, underinvest in product improvements and diﬀerentiation, and
stiﬂe innovation. In such a simple world, what antitrust authorities should do
is unambiguously to ﬁght against incumbents: punish their aggressive pricing
strategies as predatory, and their accommodating pricing strategies as well (but
in this case as monopolistic strategies), punish investments in complementary
markets as attempts to monopolize them, forbid bundling strategies, and so on.
The bottom line is that antitrust authorities should sanction virtually all be-
haviours of the incumbents which do not conform to those of their competitors.
The fallacy of this line of thought, in my view, derives from a simple fact: it is
based on a partial theory which does not take into account that, at least in most
cases, entry by competitors is not an exogenous fact, but an endogenous decision.
2The post-Chicago school as shown that in presence of asymmetric information between
ﬁrms, of credit market imperfections and of strategic commitments to undertake preliminary
investments the above argument breaks down and predatory pricing can be an equilibrium
strategy for the incumbent and deter entry.
3See Motta (2004) for a survey.
6Whether entry is more or less costly, entry is an endogenous decision by the
potential competitors, especially in global markets as most markets in the New
Economy. There are two diﬀerent kinds of constraints on entry. The deﬁnition
of barriers to entry has been quite debated in the literature. Bain associated
them with the situation in which established ﬁrms can elevate their selling prices
above minimal average costs of production without inducing entry in the long
run, Stigler with costs of production which must be borne by ﬁrms which seek
to enter an industry but not borne by incumbents. A similar approach has
been prevailing more recently (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982), so that we
can talk of barriers to entry as sunk costs of entry for the competitors which
are above the corresponding costs of the incumbent (or have been already paid
by the incumbent). On the contrary, simple ﬁxed costs of entry are equally
faced by the incumbent and the followers to produce in the market, but they
also constrain entry. Actually, while there is a fundamental diﬀerence between
the two concepts, their role in constraining entry, and hence in endogenizing
it, is basically the same. In our view, only a comprehensive understanding of
the behaviour of incumbents when entry is endogenous and when it is not can
provide the required tools to judge real world markets.
3 The Theory of Market Leaders
T h et h e o r yo fm a r k e tl e a d e r sc l a r i ﬁes the role of market leaders under more
general conditions than the post-Chicago approach. In this section we will
discuss its results and compare its implications for antitrust with those of the
traditional approach.
Let us start from a general model of Stackelberg competition in which a
main diﬀerence between the new and the old approach emerges. Consider a
market with price competition between ﬁrms oﬀering imperfectly substitutable
goods, zero marginal costs of production, for simplicity, and a sunk cost of
entry S which the market leader does not bear. When a ﬁrm sets the price








assume that demand is decreasing in the ﬁrst argument: a higher price by i
reduces i’s demand. Moreover demand is also decreasing in the second argument
while the function g(p) is decreasing in the price, so that a higher price by
any ﬁrm j increases demand for ﬁrm i, as reasonable. This demand function
generalizes most common demand functions used by economists, as those derived
by isoelastic utilities, Logit demands, constant expenditure demands and the


















Consider ﬁrst the simple case with just a single follower, which was the subject
of analysis of most literature in the post-Chicago approach. When the sunk cost
S is small enough, the follower is active in equilibrium and chooses its own price,
say pF, as a function of the price of the leader pL, according to the optimality
condition:
D1[pF,g(pL)]pF + D[pF,g(pL)] = 0
Under standard conditions (strategic complementarity), this implies a price in-
creasing in the price of the leader. Then the leader chooses its own price taking
this into account, according to the optimality condition:




Since the last term is positive, we can conclude that pL >p F. The intuition
of this outcome is quite simple. The leader is aware that the higher will be its
own price, the higher will be the price chosen by the follower, and both ﬁrms
will have larger proﬁts. Hence the leader exploits its ﬁrst mover advantage to
set a high price.
A fundamental contribution by Dixit (1980) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984),
at the origins of the post-Chicago approach, was to show that, when the sunk
cost S is high enough, the optimal strategy for the leader may be an entry
deterring strategy which requires a low enough price. The policy implication
was immediate: any low pricing strategy by a leader must be associated with
predatory pricing, otherwise a market leader would prefer to be accomodating,
setting high prices.
Unfortunately, this story has a simp l eb u tp e r v a s i v ep r o b l e m . L e tu sg o
back to the hypothetical situation in which the sunk cost S is small enough,
so that the follower is active in the duopoly equilibrium. In such a situation it
may well be the case that one or more other ﬁrms could also ﬁnd proﬁtable to
enter in this market after bearing the small sunk cost. If this is the case, and
t h i sm u s tb et h ec a s ew h e nS is small enough, the right equilibrium concept
for this market has to take endogenous entry in consideration. In Etro (2002)
I have solved for this equilibrium, showing that it is characterized by the same
optimality condition for each follower as above:
D1(pF,·)pF + D(pF,·)=0
an endogenous entry condition equating gross proﬁts of each follower to the
sunk cost of entry:
D(pF,·)pF = S
8and the following optimality condition for the leader:4
D1(pL,·)pL + D(pL,·) − D2(pL,·)g0(pF)pL =0
Now the last term is negative, suggesting that pL <p F. When entry is endoge-
nous, whether just one or many followers end up entering in the market, the
leader is always aggressive setting a lower price than each one of the entrant.
Hence, a low pricing strategy is associated with a normal strategy of the market
leader when entry is endogenous, and not with entry deterrence purposes.
This is the general principle emerging from the theory of market leaders,
at the basis of our critique to the post-Chicago approach to antitrust. It actu-
ally emerges in more general situations, as shown by Etro (2006a): whenever
the leader can engage in preliminary investments, while in duopoly it will bias
them strategically to increase its price in the market, under endogenous en-
try it will bias them in the opposite way, to decrease its price in the market.
For instance, if a cost reducing technology exists, Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)
have shown that a duopoly leader will underinvest in it, while Etro (2006a) has
shown that the same leader will overinvest in it a long as entry in the market
is endogenous. This outcome emerges in many other contexts with surprising
results with respect to investments in R&D and exploitation of network eﬀects,
important factors in markets of the New Economy, in case of bundling of goods
and many other situations: some of these are examined in detail in the Ap-
pendix. The general point is that in any market where entry is endogenous,
the leader always overinvests to gain a strategic advantage and conquer a larger
market share; however, this results in a reduction in prices with a net gain for
consumers.
Until now we considered a market structure which is quite standard be-
cause goods are imperfect substitute. However, our results become even more
drammatic with quantity competition and homogenous goods. To see why this
happens, imagine a market of homogeneous products where production requires
again a ﬁxed sunk cost S and a zero marginal cost of production. Moreover,
imagine that ﬁrms choose their production level and the market price just
equates demand and supply. Such a simple structure approximates the situ-
a t i o ni nm a n ys e c t o r sw h e r ep r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation is not very important but
there are high costs to start production: this is typical of energy and telecom-
munication industries and many other high-tech sectors of the New Economy.
The assumption of constant (and indeed zero) marginal cost matches the con-
4Proof: Equilibrium demand for the followers is D[pF,g(pL)+(n−2)g(pF)] where n is the
number of ﬁrms active in the market. The equilibrium ﬁrst order condition and the endogenous
entry condition for the followers pin down both arguments pF and β = g(pL)+( n − 2)g(pF)
independently from the leader’strategy pL: only the number of ﬁrms changes with the price
of the leader. Hence, the proﬁts of the leader can be written as:
πL = pLD[pL,(n − 1)g(pF)] = pLD[pL,β+ g(pF) − g(pL)]
whose maximization provides the equilibrium ﬁrst order condition in the text.
9ditions of some markets, as the software one, where variable costs are negligible
compared to R&D expenditure.
Imagine that inverse demand is a decreasing function of total production,
p(
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As well known, a Stackelberg duopoly would imply a division of the market
between the leader and the follower. A Stackelberg equilibrium with endogenous
entry, however, generates a diﬀerent result. If the supply of the leader xL is





xj is total production. The endogenous entry condition will be:
xp(X)=S
It is clear that these two conditions will pin down both the strategy of the
followers x, and total production X, and hence the price p(X). Hence the
perceived proﬁt of the leader becomes:
πL = xLp(X)
which is always trivially increasing in its supply. Hence the leader will always
produce as much as possible. No other ﬁrm will ﬁnd convenient to enter in
the market, but nevertheless the price will be determined by the free entry
condition and hence it will be the same as in absence of the leader. Notice that
the same result would emerge with any kind of constant or decreasing marginal
cost function.
Etro (2002) also proves that this outcome is better for consumers than the
free entry equilibrium without a leadership, but the point here is simpler: under
certain technological conditions, it is natural for the leader to conquer a large
market share while supplying it at a competitive price determined by a zero
proﬁt condition (but this is referred to the entrants, while the leader earns
positive proﬁts). These technological conditions amount to high sunk costs
or ﬁxed costs of production (which may be R&D costs as well) and constant
marginal costs of production. Of course network eﬀect would even strenghten
the result, as shown in the Appendix. On the other side, introducing imperfect
substitutability or increasing marginal costs would allow the followers to conquer
market shares. Nevertheless, the general principle would always hold: the leader
10would be aggressive and price below its followers retaining a larger market share
because of the competitive pressure.
This discussion implies two main conclusions. First, a leading market posi-
tion associated with aggressive strategic investments can be the consequence of
a competitive market environment and not the result of market power. In other
words, the theory of market leaders suggests that it would be better to diﬀeren-
tiate market leaders from dominant ﬁrms: market leaders have some strategic
competitive advantage over their competitors, but only when they can use it to
prevent eﬀective competition and harm consumers should they be considered to
be dominant and their behaviour potentially abusive. The point is to understand
when market leaders can prevent eﬀective competition and when they cannot.
Second, whenever ﬁrms engage in price competition, the post-Chicago approach
associates aggressive pricing or other aggressive strategies with a predatory pur-
pose, while the theory of market leaders shows the conditions under which an
aggressive strategy is pro-competitive and without exclusionary purposes.
4 The Software Market and the Microsoft Case
As a case study, we will consider the software market, one of the markets of the
so-called New Economy, developed in the very last decades through progress
in the Information & Communication Technology.5 The software market was
developed in the very last decades. In the 1960s, the computer industry was
dominated by IBM, which manufactured mainframe computers that were used
by large enterprise customers. These computers were expensive to purchase and
expensive to maintain. As a result, very few consumers had access to computers.
Apart from IBM, mainframes were oﬀered by ﬁrms such as Bull, Burroughs,
Data General, Fujitsu, ICL, Nixdorf and Sperry-Rand. There was little or no
interoperability among mainframes from diﬀerent vendors. For the most part, an
enterprise customer was required to choose an all IBM solution or an all Nixdorf
solution. In the 1970s, Digital Equipment achieved considerable success with
a line of less expensive minicomputers that were well-suited to engineering and
scientiﬁc tasks. Again, however, there was little or no interoperability between
these minicomputers and mainframes oﬀered by IBM and others. The structure
of the industry at that time was still largely vertical.
5In a recent important book, Evans et al. (2006) have emphasized the crucial role that
software platforms are playing in shaping our economies, the functioning and the development
of many sectors, and ultimately our way of living. These “invisible engines”, as they call
them, power not only the PC industry but also other industries as mobile phones, i-phones,
video games, digital music, and (with strong externalities for the rest of the economy) on-line
auctions, online searches and web-based advertising. Their convincing claim is that, as the
steam engine was at the basis of the ﬁrst industrial revolution (1760-1830) and electric power
at the basis of the second industrial revolution (1850-1930), microprocessors and software
platforms are at the basis of the third industrialr e v o l u t i o nw h i c hs t a r t e da r o u n d1 9 8 0w i t h
the introduction of commercial PCs and had a second phase starting in 1995 with the Internet.
11By 1980, a number of companies had started oﬀering less expensive micro-
computers which were not interoperable with one another. Early PCs by Tandy,
Apple, Commodore and Atari ran their own operating systems, meaning that
applications written for one brand of P Cw o u l dn o tr u no na n yo t h e rb r a n d :t h e
industry was fragmented. In mid-1980, IBM announced plans to introduce an
IBM personal computer. The ﬁrst one was oﬀered with a choice of three oper-
ating systems: CP/M-86 from Digital Research, UCSD-P System and MS-DOS
from Microsoft, a company founded by Bill Gates, a young software architect
who dropped Harvard University to create what was going to become a symbol
of market leadership in the New Economy.
Over time, the computer industry moved from the old vertical structure to-
ward a horizontal structure with a market for chips (Intel, Motorola, RISCs),
one for hardware (IBM, Hewlett-Packard Dell, Packard Bell, Compaq, Acer,..),
one for operating systems (Windows, Dos, OS/2, Mac, Unix), one for applica-
tion software (Word, Excel, Lotus,..) and one for sales and distribution, with
competition within horizontal levels and higher interoperability across levels.
To understand the peculiarities of the software market in general it is conve-
nient to focus brieﬂy on the main functions of PC operating systems. The main
one is to serve as a platform on which applications (such as spreadsheets or word
processors) can be created by software developers. Operating systems supply
diﬀerent types of functionality, referred to as system services, that software de-
velopers can call upon in creating their applications. These systems services
are made available through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). When
an application calls a particular API, the operating system supplies the system
service associated with that API by causing the microprocessor to execute a
speciﬁed set of instructions. Windows provides software developers with thou-
sands of APIs, including many that provide access to media functionality in the
operating system. Software developers need well-deﬁned platforms that remain
stable over time. They need to know whether the system services on which their
applications rely will be present on any g i v e nP C .I ft h e yd i dn o t ,t h e ns o f t w a r e
d e v e l o p e r sw o u l dh a v et ow r i t et h es o f t w a r ec o d et op r o v i d ee q u i v a l e n tf u n c t i o n -
ality in their own applications, generating redundancy, ineﬃciency and a lack
of interoperability. Moreover, modern OSs provide a user interface, the means
by which a user interacts with his computer. User interfaces for computers have
evolved dramatically over the last decades, from punch card readers, to tele-
type terminals, to character-based user interfaces, to Graphical User Interfaces
(GUIs), ﬁrst introduced by Apple with Macintosh. Finally, operating systems
enable users to ﬁnd and use information contained in various storage devices:
local ones, such as a ﬂoppy diskette, a CD-ROM drive or the hard drive built
into a PC, or remote, such as local area networks that connect computers in a
particular oﬃce, wide area networks that connect computers in geographically
separated oﬃces, and the Internet.
Over time, the operating systems of Microsoft became the most popular be-
cause Microsoft continually added new functionality to the operating system and
12licensed it to a wide range of computer manufacturers with extremely aggressive
pricing strategies. Microsoft recognised early on that an operating system that
served as a common platform for developing applications and could run on a
wide range of PCs would provide substantial beneﬁts to consumers. Among
other advantages, development costs would fall and a broader array of products
would become available because products could be developed for the common
platform rather than for a large number of diﬀerent platforms. By providing a
single operating system that ran on multiple brands of PCs, Microsoft enabled
software developers to create applications, conﬁdent that users could run those
applications on PCs from many diﬀerent computer manufacturers. In addition,
applications developed for a single platform were more easily interoperable be-
cause they rely on the same functionality supplied by the underlying operating
system. Microsoft adopted a business model focused on the creation of OSs
that provide a common platform for developing and running applications de-
spite diﬀerences in underlying PC hardware, interfaces providing a consistent
mechanism for users to interact with their computers and thus to transfer their
knowledge from one computer to another, and the creation of network eﬀects
between consumers and software developers. The last point is crucial: com-
puter manufacturers beneﬁt because their PCs can run the many applications
written for Windows and because users are familiar with the Windows user
interface. Software developers beneﬁt because their applications can rely on
system services exposed by Windows via published APIs and because they can
write applications with assurance that they will run on a broad range of PCs.
Consumers beneﬁt because they can choose from among thousands of PC mod-
els and applications that will all work well with one another and because such
broad compatibility fosters intense competition among computer manufacturers
and software developers to deliver improved products at attractive prices.
In 1981, Microsoft released its ﬁrst operating system, MS-DOS, which had
a character-based user interface that required users to type speciﬁc instructions
to perform tasks. In 1985, Microsoft introduced a new product called Windows
that included a GUI, enabling users to perform tasks by clicking on icons on the
screen using a pointing device called a mouse. Windows 3.0, shipped in 1990,
was the ﬁrst commercially successful version of Windows. In 1995, Microsoft
released Windows 95, which integrated the functionality of Windows 3.1 and
MS-DOS in a single operating system. In 2000, Microsoft shipped Windows 2000
Professional, a new generation of PC operating system built on a more stable
and reliable software code base than earlier versions of Windows. Windows
XP and Vista represent further evolutions with a range of added functionality
for both business and home users. Even if oﬃcial and unanimous data are
unavailable, consistent evidence suggests that the market share of Windows on
sales of OSs for PCs rapidly increased toward 80% in the ﬁrst half of the 90s
to gradually arrive at 92% in 1996, 94% in 1997, 95% in 1999, 96% 2001 (and
remained basically at this level since then): meanwhile the average consumer
price of Windows (calculated as average revenue per licence in OEM channel
13based on Microsoft sales) was constant around 44-45 $.
Beyond OSs, Microsoft produces very successful applications. Some essential
applications have been freely bundled with the operating system: for instance
a basic word processing software, WordPad, a browser to access Internet and
media player functionalities have been gradually added for free to subsequent
versions of Windows when they became standard components of a modern OS.
Other more sophisticated applications are supplied separately. Most notably
this is the case of the Oﬃce Suite consisting of the word processor Word, the
spreasheet Excel, the software for presentations PowerPoint and more. The main
two applications, Word and Excel, have been successfully competing against
alternative products like WordPerfect, WordStar, AmiPro and others on one
side and Lotus, Quattro and others on the other side. Liebowitz and Margolis
(1999) have shown convincing evidence for which a better quality/price ratio
together with network eﬀects were at the basis of this evolution (it is important
to notice that Microsoft achieved leadership in the Macintosh market, hence
without exploiting the presence of its own OS, considerably earlier than in the
PC market).6 In the market for word processing applications, Microsoft’s mar-
ket share was hardly above 10% at the end of the 80s, to gradually increase at
28% in 1990, 40% in 1991, 45% in 1992, 50% in 1993, 65% in 1994, 79% in 1995,
90% in 1996, 94% in 1997 and to arrive at 95% in 1998, to remain around this
level afterward, meanwhile the average consumer price of Word (calculated as
average revenue per license) decreased from 235 $ in 1988 to 39 $ in 2001. In
the market for spreadsheet applications, Microsoft followed a similar progress,
with a market share of 18% in 1990, 34% in 1991, 43% in 1992, 46% in 1993,
68% in 1994, 77% in 1995, 84% in 1996, 92% in 1997 and 94% in 1998, with
minor progress in the following years, while the average consumer price of Excel
was decreasing from 249 $ in 1988 to 42 $ in 2001.
The leading position of Microsoft induced large opposition in the industry
and the emergence of multiple antitrust cases with importance at a global level.
I nt h em a i nM i c r o s o f tv s .U Sc a s e ,d e v e l o p e di nt h el a t en i n e t i e s ,t h es o f t -
ware company was accused of protecting the monopoly in the PC operating
systems market for Intel-compatible computers from the joint threat of the In-
ternet browser Netscape Navigator7 and the Java programming language, which
could have developed a potential substitute for OSs allowing software applica-
tions to run on hardware independently from the desktop OS. Microsoft reacted
improving its Internet Explorer (IE) browser, engaging in contractual agree-
ments with computer manufacturers and Internet service providers to promote
6Microsoft did not achieve large market shares for other important applications, for instance
for personal ﬁnance software.
7The drammatic expansion of the WorldWide Web started in 1993 after the development
by a team from the University of Illinois of the ﬁrts graphical web browser, Mosaic. Netscape,
founded in 1994, hired most of its developers to create Navigator. Java was developed at the
same time by Sun as a middleware product to allow programmers to write applications that
would run on line on any computer regardless of the underlying OS.
14preferential treatment for IE, and ﬁnally tying Windows with IE.
As Klein (2001) has pointed out in an academic survey on the Journal of
Economic Perspectives (Symposium on the Microsoft case), “Microsoft spent
hundreds of millions of dollars developing an improved version of its browser
software and then marketed it aggressively, most importantly by integrating it
into Windows, pricing it at zero and paying online service providers and personal
computer manufacturers for distribution. All of this was aimed at increasing
use of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browser technology, both by end users and
software developers, to blunt Netscape’s threat to the dominance by Windows of
the market for personal computer operating systems.” Microsoft’s investments in
browser technology, which largely improved IE until it became a superior prod-
uct compared to Netscape Navigator (see the empirical analysis in Liebowitz
and Margolis, 1999), and Microsoft’s pricing of IE at zero (as always since then)
appear to us as examples of aggressive strategic investment and aggressive pric-
ing by a market leader facing competition and not as anti-competitive strategies.
According to Klein (2001), “a crucial condition for anticompetitive behaviour in
such cases is that the competitive process is not open. In particular, we should
be concerned only if a dominant ﬁrm abuses its market power in a way that
places rivals at a signiﬁcant competitive disadvantage without any reasonable
business justiﬁcation. Only under these circumstances can more eﬃcient rivals
be driven out of the market and consumers not receive the full beneﬁts of compe-
tition for dominance. The only Microsoft conduct...that may ﬁt this criteria for
anticompetitive behaviour are the actions Microsoft took in obtaining browser
distribution through personal computer manufacturers”.
After an initial decision which imposed heavy behavioural and structural
remedies on Microsoft, including the break up in a operating system and an ap-
plication company (the socalled “Baby Bills”), the November 2002 ruling of the
District of Court decided on behavioural remedies aimed at preventing Microsoft
from adopting exclusionary strategies against ﬁrms challenging its market power
in the market for operating systems. Moreover, the Court adopted forward look-
ing remedies that required limited disclosure of APIs, communication protocols,
and related technical information in order to facilitate interoperability, and cre-
ated a system of monitoring of Microsoft’s compliance which has been working
quite well in the last years. Since also other derivative private actions have been
dismissed or settled, it seems that this longstanding conﬂict has arrived to its
end in the US.
The Microsoft vs. EU case was developed on somewhat similar issues. In
particular Microsoft has been accused of abuse of dominance in the market for
OSs through technological leveraging, refusing to supply competitors with the
interface information needed to achieve interoperability with Microsoft software,
and bundling Windows with Media Player, a software to download audio/video
content. At the time of writing, the case is still unresolved: Microsoft’s Appeal
of the Commission’s March 2004 antitrust decision was heart by the European
Court of First Instance in April 2006 and a decision is expected for the end of the
15year. In the 2004 landmark decision, the Commission imposed the largest ﬁne
in the history of antitrust, required Microsoft to issue a version of its Windows
operating system without Media Player, and mandated the licensing of intellec-
tual property to enable interoperability between Windows PCs and work group
servers and competitor products.
A common element in both cases has been the substantial involvment of
c o m p e t i t o r so fM i c r o s o f to nt h es i d eo ft h ea n t i t r u s ta u t h o r i t i e s . I nan e a t
article on Business Week, Barro (1998) noticed that “a sad sidelight in the
Microsoft case is the cooperation of its competitors, Netscape, Sun and Oracle
Corp., with the government. One might have expected these robust innovators
to rise above the category of whiner corporations... The real problem is that
whining can sometimes be proﬁtable, because the political process makes it
so. The remedy requires a shift in public policies to provide less reward for
whining. The bottom line is that the best policy for the government in the
computer industry is to stay out of it.” Nevertheless, in the European case Sun,
Oracle, IBM, Novell and the Free Software Movement have been active sides
against Microsoft.
While a comprehensive analysis on the software market and of the role of
Microsoft is beyond the scope of this paper, we can try to provide a basic inter-
pretation of a few features of this market through the standard tools of industrial
organization theory and those developed in the theory of market leaders. The
technological conditions in the software market are well known. Producing soft-
ware (whether it is an operating system or a particular application) takes a
very high up-front investment and a constant marginal cost which, as is well
known, is close to zero. The entry conditions in this market are more debated,
but there are good reasons to believe that even though entry into the software
market may entail large costs, it is substantially endogenous. First of all, there
are already many ﬁrms active in this sector, and even more potential entrants
— think of the giants in adjacent sectors of the New Economy (hardware and
telecommunications in particular). Second, it is hard to think of a market
which is more “global” than the software market: demand comes from all over
the world, transport costs are virtually zero, the knowledge required to build
software is easily accessible worldwide and competition is global. Nevertheless,
it has been claimed that in the market for PC (or client) operating systems,
the high number of applications developed by many diﬀerent ﬁrms for Windows
represents a substantial barrier to entry. Unfortunately, such a claim usually
leads to misleading conclusions. Iti st r u et h a tc o m p e t i t o r sn e e dt oo ﬀer (and
some do oﬀer already) a number of standard and technologically mature appli-
cations upon entry to match the high quality of the Windows package, but the
cost of oﬀering these applications is unlikely to be prohibitive compared to the
global size of this market. There are at least two reasons for this. First, notice
that the alleged “applications barrier to entry” is often erroneously associated
with thousands of applications written for Windows, while it is actually limited
to a handful of applications such as word processing, spreadsheet, graphics, in-
16ternet access and media player software, which really satisfy the needs of most
active computer users (McKenzie, 2001). Second, the competitors of Microsoft
should not (and the existing ones do not) even ﬁnance the development of all
the needed applications: as Microsoft did in most cases, they should just fund
and encourage other ﬁrms to write applications for their operating system (or
have old applications originally written for other operating systems “ported to”
theirs). Finally, it is important to emphasize that if we look at competition
in the software market in a dynamic sense, that is competition for the market
(as opposed to competition in the market) or through innovations, there is no
doubt that the opportunity to invest in innovations for future, better software
is widely open not only to large companies in the New Economy, but even to
smaller ones.
Summarizing, the software market is characterized by high costs of produc-
tion, constant marginal costs close to zero and substantially open access by
competitors able to create new software. According to the new theory of mar-
ket leaders these are the ideal conditions under which we should expect a leader
to produce for the whole market with very aggressive (low) prices. Hence, it
should not be surprising that, at least in the market for operating systems, a
single ﬁrm, Microsoft, has such a large market share. We can see the same fact
from a diﬀerent perspective: since entry into the software market is endogenous,
the leader has to keep prices low enough to expand its market share to almost
the whole market. Notice that network externalities require these prices to be
even lower because competitors could (and indeed try to) oﬀer their alternative
software at even lower prices to build their own network eﬀects.8
Many economists agree on the fact that Microsoft sells Windows at an ex-
tremely low price. For instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) notice that both
sides in the US Microsoft case agreed that “Microsoft’s pricing of Windows does
not correspond to short run proﬁt maximization by a monopolist. Schmalensee’s
direct testimony argues that Microsoft’s low prices are due at least in part to
its concern that higher prices would encourage other ﬁrms to develop compet-
ing operating systems” even if, they add, “neither side has proposed a formal
model where such ‘limit pricing’ would make sense.” To formalize this argu-
ment, assume for simplicity that the marginal cost of producing Windows is
zero, and that the price of hardware is constant and independent from the price
of Windows. Standard economic theory implies that the monopolistic price for
an operating system should be the price of the hardware divided by  −1, where
  is the elasticity of demand for PCs (including both hardware and software): it
means that a 1% increase in the price of PCs reduces demand by  %.9 Now, this
8Low prices in presence of network eﬀects are very common and often extreme: most email
services as Yahoo,s e a r c he n g i n e sa sGoogle and viewer softwares as Acrobat Reader are free
because this is the best strategy available for their leading suppliers under the constraint of
eﬀective competition. All these market leaders gain from collateral services or products whose
demand is strenghtened by their strategy.
9Formally, let us assume that the price of the hardware is ﬁxed and independent from
17relationship tells us that, if the basic price of the hardware is 1000 Euros, which
is about the current average price for PCs, the monopolistic price for Windows
would be 1000 Euros if   = 2, it would be 500 Euros if   = 3, it would be 333
Euros if   = 4 and so on. It would take really unreasonable values of demand
elasticity to even get close to the real price of Windows, which is around 50 Eu-
ros. Moreover, the above estimate of the monopolistic price is very conservative.
In the real world, we can imagine that the price of hardware is not completely
independent from the price of Windows: if the latter would double tomorrow,
hardware producers would be forced to reduce somewhat their prices (eventu-
ally switching to lower cost techniques and/or lower quality products).10 Even
if this eﬀect may be limited by the high level of competition in the hardware
sector, it goes in the direction of increasing further the monopolistic price of
Windows, that is, even beyond the real price of Windows.
Hall and Hall (2000) developed similar calculations assuming a Cournot
competition in the hardware market and suggest that Microsoft has to adopt
a low price for Windows as a rational strategy in front of endogenous entry in
the OS market. Their conclusion is consistent with the results of the theory
of market leaders: “not only is the price of Windows brought down to a small
fraction of its monopoly price, but the social waste of duplicative investment in
operating systems is avoided as well.”
It has been claimed that low Windows pricing may be explained with the
higher pricing of the complementary applications, as the Microsoft Oﬃce suite.
However, the combined price of Windows and the average application package
sold with it is still below the monopolistic price. Moreover, these applications
are not sold at lower prices for other operating systems. Finally, as Economides
(2001) pointed out, “Windows has the ability to collect surplus from the whole
assortment of applications that run on top of it. Keeping Windows’ price ar-
tiﬁcially low would subsidize not only MS-Oﬃce, but also the whole array of
that of the software. Given a demand D(h + w) decreasing in the price of the hardware
h plus the price of Windows w,t h eg r o s sp r o ﬁt of a monopolist in the operating system
market would be wD(h + w) and would be maximized by a price of Windows w∗ such that
D(h + w∗)+w∗D0(h + w∗)=0o r :
w =
h
  − 1




10Formally, think that the price of hardware h(w)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nt h a to fW i n d o w s( w e
could endogenize the actual eﬀect but this is beyond the scope of this discussion). Then, we
can rework the monopolistic price of Windows as:
w∗ =
h(w∗)
 [1 + h0(w∗)] − 1
which is higher that in absence of this translation eﬀect (remember that h0(w∗) < 0): a
monopolist would price Windows even more because part of the potential reduction in demand
due to a higher price would be avoided thanks to an induced reduction in the price of the
hardware.
18tens of thousands of Windows applications that are not produced by Microsoft.
Therefore, even if Microsoft had a monopoly power in the Oﬃce market, keeping
the price of Windows low is deﬁnitely not the optimal way to collect surplus.”
What does all this tell us? Simply that Microsoft is not an unconstrained
price-setter, while its prices are limited well below the monopolistic price to
compete aggressively with the other ﬁrms active in the operating system mar-
ket and with the potential entrants in it. Economides (2001) concludes in a
similar fashion: “Microsoft priced low because of the threat of competition.
This means that Microsoft believed that it could not price higher it if were to
maintain its market position.” Indeed, we can say more than just that Microsoft
is not a monopoly. What the post-Chicago approach suggested about leaders
in markets with price competition was that they should be accommodating and
exploit their market power, setting higher prices than competitors, or otherwise
engage in predatory pricing and, after having conquered the whole market, in-
crease prices. But in the last 10-15 years of global leadership, Microsoft has
done neither of these things. Microsoft has been constantly aggressive, as any
ﬁrm under the threat of competitive pressure would be. The theory of market
leaders has shown that a market leader in these conditions would price above
marginal cost in such a way to compensate for the ﬁxed costs of investment
and obtain a proﬁt margin (over the average costs of production) thanks to the
economies of scale derived from the large (worldwide in the case of Microsoft)
scale of production. Its (quality adjusted) price should be slightly below that
of its immediate competitors or just low enough to avoid that they can exploit
proﬁtable opportunities increasing their prices. Where other theories cannot,
t h et h e o r yo fm a r k e tl e a d e r sc a nm a k ep e r f e c ts e n s eo fM i c r o s o f t ’ sl a r g es h a r e
of the software market, large proﬁts and relatively low prices.
5 Bundling
One of the issues where the new theory of market leaders applies and provides
new insights for antitrust policy is bundling, that is, the combination of two
separate products in a single one sold alone. Virtually any product is a bundle
since it combines multiple basic products which could be or are sold separately:
a car bundles many separate components, shoes bundle shoes without laces and
shoelaces, a computer bundles hardware, an operating system and basic software
applications of general interest. In some cases, bundling is just a contractual
restriction used to force customers to purchase an ancillary product in an after-
market for goods or services, while in other cases bundling improves a ﬁnished
product by integrating new components or features into it: of course, only the
ﬁrst situation should be subject to antitrust investigation.
There are contrasting views on bundling. The Chicago school has advanced
eﬃciency rationales in its favour with positive, or at worst ambiguous, conse-
quences on welfare, including production or distribution cost savings, reduction
19in transaction costs for customers, protection of intellectual property, prod-
uct improvements, quality assurance and legitimate price responses. Moreover,
according to the so-called “single monopoly proﬁt theorem”, as long as the sec-
ondary market is competitive, a monopolist in a separate market cannot increase
its proﬁts in the former by tying the two products. Actually, in the presence of
complementarities, it can only gain from having competition and high sales in
the secondary market to enhance demand in its monopolistic market. A similar
theory has been advanced at a theoretical level by Davis and Murphy (2000)
and by Economides (2001) to explain the tying strategies of Microsoft. With
particular reference to the US case, Economides (2001) notes that Microsoft
could not have been interested in the browser market when this was perfectly
competitive, but only when this market became dominated by Netscape for two
main reasons. “First, Netscape had a dominant position in the browser market,
thereby taking away from Microsoft’s operating system proﬁts to the extent
that Windows was used together with the Navigator. Second, as the markets
for Internet applications and electronic commerce exploded, the potential loss to
Microsoft from not having a top browser increased signiﬁcantly... Clearly, Mi-
crosoft had a pro-competitive incentive to freely distribute IE since that would
stimulate demand for the Windows platform.” The very same point could be
made for the free distribution of Media Player with Windows, the subject of the
tying part of the EU case.
The post-Chicago approach has shown that, when the bundling ﬁrm has
some market power, commitment to bundling can only be used for exclusionary
purposes since it enhances competition in the secondary market and increases
the proﬁts of the leader only if it excludes rivals from this secondary market
(Whinston, 1990). Nevertheless, even the same proponent of this theory has
expressed doubts on its applicability to Microsoft: evaluating the tying of Win-
dows and IE, Whinston (2001) notes that “Microsoft seems to have introduced
relatively little incompatibility with other browsers. Since marginal cost is es-
sentially zero, bundling could exclude Netscape only if consumers, or computer
manufacturers for them, faced other constraints on adding Navigator to their
system”, which did not appear to be the case.
As we have formally shown, the theory of market leaders emphasizes that
when entry in the secondary market is endogenous, an incumbent may only gain
in this market by adopting an aggressive pricing strategy and in our framework,
bundling the primary good and the secondary good is exactly a way to commit
to aggressive pricing. Hence, bundling is the standard competitive strategy of
the incumbent as long as the reduction in the proﬁts in the primary market
is compensated by the gains in the secondary market. Of course, if there is
some complementarity between the products, or there are unexploited network
eﬀects, the expansion of demand following the bundling strategy with aggressive
pricing can make more likely that bundling is optimal. But what matters for our
purposes is that bundling is not an extreme strategy adopted by an incumbent
ﬁrm to deter entry, but a standard aggressive strategy that, by reducing the
20ﬁnal prices, may indeed reduce entry by followers but would not exclude entry
overall. Hence, in a world of price competition, it appears hard to conclude that
bundling could be used as a predatory strategy when it does not lead to the
exit of all the competitors, but just to a permanent reduction of the price level.
To sum up, when approaching a bundling case we suggest to verify the entry
conditions of the secondary market. If there is a dominant ﬁrm in this market
as well, the main problem is not the bundling strategy, but the lack of com-
petition in the secondary market, and it should be addressed within that same
market: punishing the bundling strategy would just guarantee the monopolistic
(or duopolistic) rents of the dominant ﬁrm in the secondary market. However,
things are diﬀerent when the secondary market is not monopolized but open to
endogenous entry (even if it is not perfectly competitive, in the sense that ﬁrms
do not price at marginal cost). In such a case bundling is a pro-competitive
strategy and punishing it would hurt consumers.
In the case of Microsoft, we have the impression that in both bundling cases,
that of Windows with Internet Explorer and that of Windows with Media Player,
the tied market was characterized and (most of all) still is characterized by
endogenous entry: just think of new successfull browsers as Mozilla or Firefox
and media player softwares as RealPlayer, Quick or the more recent Macromedia
Flash. Consequently the bundling strategy of Microsoft could be simply seen as
an aggressive and competitive strategy of a market leader active in a secondary
market where entry is indeed free.
Beyond this theoretical point, it should be added, that in dynamic markets
as the software market, the same concept of a good is changing over time, since
both demand and supply change. If demand by PC users for media player func-
tionalities was limited just a few years ago, now it appears that these functional-
ities are an essential component of a OS. Because of this, an increasing number
of software applications and on line services are associated with media player
functionalities, so that demand is even strenghtened by network eﬀects. Finally,
as a consequence of this, better OSs must take into account the necessities of
these functionalities and bundling has a natural technological rationale. In other
words, while a few years ago a OS and a media player could be regarded as sepa-
rate goods whose union could be associated with a bundling strategy, nowadays
a OS must incorporate media player functionalities (as it must incorporate a
browser) so that we cannot even talk of a traditional form of bundling.11 In this
perspective, the attempts of antitrust authorities to stop or delay the evolution
of OS through additional features, as browsers and media players, appear quite
dangerous: while it is diﬃcult to verify in which moment it would be optimal to
bundle secondary products in an evolving primary product, it is not clear why
antitrust authorities should have a better guess than market driven ﬁrms.
Notice that since the 2004 Commission’s decision, Microsoft had to prepare
11This is common for software. For instance, word processors and spell checkers were in
separate markets many years ago, not today. Handwriting and voice recognition are separate
today, but we can expect that they will be integrated in word processors at some point soon.
21and commercialize a version of Windows without Media Player in Europe. Just
after that important students of bundling issues have notice that “all we need
to know is that if the remedy does have any impact, that’s a sure sign that
Microsoft abused its position and hence we should be happy to have the remedy
in place. Just as King Solomon’s proposal to divide the baby only caused pain to
the true mother, the Commission’s remedy will only cause pain to a monopolist
who abused its position.” (Ayres and Nabeluﬀ, 2005). Demand for the version
of Windows without Media Player has been virtually zero in all Europe, a likely
sign that Microsoft bundling strategy was at least not hurting consumers.
6 IPRs and Interoperability
The software market is a main example of an industry where competition is
mainly for the market, and in such an industry, large market shares by single
ﬁrms are a typical outcome. The counterpart of this, of course, is that these
markets can exhibit catastrophic entry where innovators can replace current
leaders quite quickly. As noticed in Etro (2004), in such an environment, it is
exactly when competition is open that leaders have incentives to invest deeply
to retain their leadership. On the contrary, when competition is limited, tech-
nological leaders can have a quiet life and accept the risk that someone will
come up with a better product, but when competition is open this same risk
is too high and incumbents prefer to accept the challenge and try to innovate
ﬁrst, obtaining a more persistent leadership.
The theory of market leaders applied to competition for the market shows
that innovation by leaders creates a virtuous circle that has also important
implications for the way we can evaluate such a market. The endogenous per-
sistence of the technological leadership has a value that incentivates all ﬁrms to
invest even more, which strenghtens the same incentives of the leader to invest
to retain its leadership, and so on. In other words, persistence of leadership
is a source of strong competition for the market (through investments in R&D
to replace the current leader), and, given that leaders have higher incentives to
invest as long as the race to innovate is open, we can also conclude that strong
competition for the market is a source of persistence of leadership. This circular
argument may appear paradoxical, but it is the fruit of a radical distinction be-
tween static and dynamic competition: once again, there is not any consistent
correlation between market shares and market power in dynamic markets.
The endogenous multiplicative eﬀe c to ft h ev a l u eo fl e a d e r s h i pt h a tw eh a v e
just summarized implies that in dynamic markets the rents of a leader may be
spectacularly larger than those of its competitors, and the market value of the
leadership may be extremely large even if the market is perfectly competitive in
a dynamic sense. In our view, this is something not too far from what we can
see in the software market and in the leadership of Microsoft, but also in many
other high-tech sectors.
22Of course, the source of the value of innovation, the starting point of the
chain of value that we just described, must be a fundamental rent associated
with innovations and protected through IPRs. Hence, all forms of IPRs, includ-
ing patents and copyrights, are the ultimate source of leadership, innovation
and technological progress. The role of patent legislation is exactly to trade
oﬀ the beneﬁts of patents in terms of incentives to innovate with the costs
related to temporary monopolistic pricing. In my own view, there is no rea-
son why antitrust authorities should interfere with this legislation every time
patent protection appears inconsistent with other goals, as the EU Commission
has been trying to do with Microsoft. And even if these goals were legitimate
and relevant, introducing a discretionary evaluation of IPRs would create un-
certainty and jeopardize investments, which, afterall, goes against the ultimate
objective of the same antitrust authorities.
It is important to add that new ideas, including those underlying Microsoft
software, are not only protected with patents. Not all inventive and innovative
activities fall under the scope of patentability and it is not always in the interest
of a ﬁrm to patent every single innovation. In most high-tech sectors, ﬁrms
adopt a combination of patents and trade secrets to protect products which are
the result of multiple innovations. Defending (intellectual or material) property
rights is one of the fundamental conditions for a proper functioning of the market
economy: defending trade secrets has not a minor role in this context. One of the
most famous trade secrets, the formula of Coca-Cola, represents a competitive
advantage for Coca-Cola. Many companies around the world invest to prepare
new and original soft drinks competing with Coke: while there is at least one
well known global competitor, Pespi, which has created a similar successful
drink, the market for soft drinks is quite competitive and there is substantially
free entry at the local level. Many competitors have tried to discover Coke’s
trade secret. Now imagine that Coca-cola was required to disclose its secret
formula. Anybody could reproduce the very same drink, “clone” it under a
diﬀerent name if you like, but it is hard to believe that this would create large
gains for consumers. Close substitutes to Coke already exist and there are small
margins to substantially reduce prices. However, the incentives for any other
ﬁrm to invest and create new products could be drastically reduced if trade
secrets would not be protected.
Things get more complicated in high-tech sectors. In these sectors trade
secrets often cover fundamental inventions and protecting them amounts to
promote innovations that are the main engine of growth nowadays. In some
ﬁelds, however, there maybe, at least apparently, a trade-oﬀ between trade
secret protection and “interoperability” between products, which is, broadly
speaking, the ability to exchange and use information and data, especially in
networks. Fortunately, giving up to the precious role of trade secrets, or other
IPRs, in promoting innovations is not the only way to solve interoperability
challenges. The market can do it much better: valuable ideas can be selectively
commercialized on a voluntary basis through licenses. Coase (1960) has clariﬁed
23that whenever there is social value to generate, the market will properly allocate
all property rights, including intellectual ones, insuring the accessibility of the
information that fuels interoperability and acknowledging legitimate ownership
rights of the innovators, and hence enhancing R&D investments.
Moreover, as Cremer et al. (2000) have recently suggested, since interoper-
ability enhances network eﬀects, it can be in the interest of the largest ﬁrms to
promote it adequately to strengthen demand for its products. Finally, in pres-
ence of network eﬀects, dynamic market forces can do even more: as long as IPRs
are well protected and ﬁrms can invest with the safe conﬁdence that successful
innovations will be rewarded, market forces can select the best standard when
multiple standards are available and interoperability is only partial. Liebowitz
and Margolis (1999) have shown that this was the case in many episodes. For
instance, in the adoption of the QWERTY keybord (so-called from the ﬁrst ﬁve
letters on the top left): for years it has been claimed that the allocation of let-
ters of this keyboard was an ineﬃcient standard, while these researchers found
out that all the evidence suggests that the Qwerty keyboard, somehow selected
by the market, is not worse than any other alternative.12
In conclusion, also in this ﬁeld, markets can properly balance the short run
and long run interests of the consumers better than policymakers: promote
innovation, enable an eﬃcient degree of interoperability and select the best
standards.
A lot of the residual contrast between Microsoft and the European Com-
mission depends on the approach to interoperability and on its ambiguity. The
Commission’s March 2004 antitrust decision mandated the licensing of intellec-
tual property to enable full interoperability between Windows PCs and work
group servers and competitor products. This point has turned out to be the
most problematic in the case: the picture that is emerging from Brussels is of
a Commission that has continued to extend the scope of the information re-
quired, while not spelling out exactly what would constitute compliance with
the remedy. As Mastrantonio (2006) has correctly pointed out, “this bias to-
wards ‘full interoperability’ could be quite dangerous. Indeed, in the event that
the imposition of a too broad restriction on its ‘exercise’ would be deemed as
‘necessary’ or that an infringement is not furnished of the ‘minimum of proof’
but notwithstanding the Court imposes a remedy, the Authority will inevitably
end up giving a direct judgement on the ‘existence’ of the property right in
question and legal certainty will break apart while innovative eﬀort will be
jeopardized.” It would be better to leave the ruling of IPRs protection and of
its limits to the legislative level rather than creating the precedent for which
antitrust authorities could force ﬁrms to reveal their IPRs.
Nevertheless, at the time of writing, Microsoft has been forced to licence
more than a hundred technologies and has even made available to its competi-
t o r st h es o u r c ec o d eo fW i n d o w s ,t h eu l t i m a t eD N Ao ft h i so p e r a t i n gs y s t e m :
12Another example is VHS winning out over Beta for home video recording.
24nevertheless in Europe not one of its competitors has taken out a license, a likely
sign that the existing level of interoperability is not as low as it was depicted.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In conclusion I would like to brieﬂy point out the main message of this paper.
Recent progress in the theory of market leaders suggests that the post-Chicago
approach to abuse of dominance can be problematic for markets characterized by
endogenous entry conditions. In particular when investments in R&D represent
a large portion of the costs of production and constrain entry, marginal costs
are approximately constant and small, and network eﬀects are present, equilib-
rium market structures are naturally characterized by large marker shares for
the leaders. These are the results of their aggressive pricing and investments
strategies which are forced by competitive pressure in the market and for the
market. Hence, antitrust authorities should be more careful in associating large
market shares and aggressive strategies with abuse of dominance in the dynamic
markets of the New Economy. Hopefully, these results may contribute to the
current debate on the reform of the EU approach to competition policy.
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27Appendix
In this appendix I will present a general model of strategic investment and Nash
competition based on Etro (2006a). Consider n ﬁrms choosing a strategic variable
xi > 0 with i =1 ,2,...,n. They all compete in Nash strategies, that is taking as
given the strategies of each other. These strategies deliver for each ﬁrm i the net proﬁt
function:
πi = Π(xi,β i,k) − F (1)
where F>0 is a ﬁxed cost of production. The ﬁrst argument is the strategy of ﬁrm
i and I assume that gross proﬁt sa r eq u a s i c o n c a v ei nxi.
The second argument represents the eﬀects (or spillovers) induced by the strategies
of the other ﬁrms on ﬁrm i’s proﬁts, summarized by βi =
Pn
k=1,k6=i h(xk) for some
function h(x) which is assumed positive, diﬀerentiable and increasing. These spillovers
exert a negative eﬀect on proﬁts, Π2 < 0.I n g e n e r a l ,t h e c r o s s e ﬀect Π12 could be
positive, so that we have strategic complementarity (SC), or negative so that we have
strategic substitutability (SS). I will deﬁne strategy xi as aggressive compared to
strategy xj when xi >x j and accommodating when the opposite holds. Notice that
a more aggressive strategy by one ﬁrm reduces the proﬁts of the other ﬁrms.
The last argument of the proﬁtf u n c t i o ni sap r o ﬁt enhancing factor (Π3 > 0)
which for all ﬁrms except the leader is constant at a level ¯ k. Only the leader is able to
make a strategic precommitment on k in a preliminary stage. The cost of its strategic
investment is given by the function f(k) with f0(k) > 0 and f00(k) > 0.O u rf o c u s
will be exactly on the incentives for this ﬁrm to undertake such an investment so as
to maximize its total proﬁts:
13
πL(k)=ΠL (xL,β L,k) − f(k) − F (2)
where xL is the strategy of the leader and βL =
P
j6=L h(xj). We will say that the
investment makes the leader tough when ΠL
13 > 0, that is an increase in k increases
the marginal proﬁtability of its strategy, while the investment makes the leader soft
i nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s e( ΠL
13 < 0).
Most of the commonly used models of oligopolistic competition in quantities and
in prices are nested in our general speciﬁcation.
14 For instance, consider a market
with quantity competition so that the strategy xi represents the quantity produced






which is decreasing in both arguments (goods are substitutes). The cost function is
c(xi) with c0(·) > 0. It follows that gross proﬁts for ﬁrm i are:
Π(xi,β i)=xip(xi,β i) − c(xi)( 3 )
13To avoid confusion, I will add the label L to denote the proﬁt function, the strategy and
the spillovers of the leader.
14Other models of oligopolistic interaction such as patent races and contests are also nested
in my general framework, but I have discussed them elsewhere (Etro, 2002; 2004). In the
following examples I omit the variable k for simplicity.
28Examples include linear and isoelastic demands and other common cases. This set up
satisﬁes our general assumptions under weak conditions and can locally imply SS (as
in most cases) or SC.
Consider now models of price competition where pi is the price of ﬁrm i.A n y








 where D1 < 0, D2 < 0, g0(p) < 0
is nested in our general framework after setting xi ≡ 1/pi and h(xi)=g(1/xi).T h i s
speciﬁcation guarantees that goods are substitutes in a standard way since ∂Di/∂pj =
D2g0(pj) > 0. Examples include models of price competition with isoelastic demand,
Logit demand, constant expenditure demand
15 and other demand functions as in the
general class due too Dixit and Stiglitz. Adopting, just for simplicity, a constant













=( pi − c)D(pi,β i)( 4 )
which is nested in our general model and, under weak conditions assumed through the
paper, implies SC.
We can now note that a more aggressive strategy corresponds to a larger production
level in models of quantity competition and a lower price under price competition. In
these models, we can introduce many kinds of preliminary investments, as we will see
later on.
Strategic investment by the leader
We will now solve for the equilibrium in the two-stage model where the leader
chooses its preliminary investment in the ﬁrst stage and all ﬁrms compete in Nash
strategies in the second stage.
For a given preliminary investment k by the leader, the second stage where ﬁrms
compete in Nash strategies is characterized by a system of n optimality conditions.





,w h e r eθ ∈ (0,1] and



















which requires g(p)=e−λp. Notice that linear demands are not nested in our model.
29For the sake of simplicity, I follow Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) by assuming that a
unique symmetric equilibrium exists and that there is entry of some followers for any
possible preliminary investment. Given the symmetry of the model, in equilibrium
each follower chooses a common strategy x and the leader chooses a strategy xL
satisfying the optimality conditions:
Π1
£
x,(n − 2)h(x)+h(xL),¯ k
¤
=0 ( 5 )
ΠL
1 [xL,(n − 1)h(x),k]=0 ( 6 )
where I use the fact that in equilibrium the spillovers of each follower is β =( n −
2)h(x)+h(xL) and of the leader is βL =( n − 1)h(x).
Before analyzing the model with free entry, it is convenient to brieﬂy summarize the
results in the presence of barriers to entry. The system above provides the equilibrium
values of the strategies as functions of the preliminary investment, x(k) and xL(k),
whose comparative statics can be easily derived. In the ﬁrst stage the leader chooses
its investment k to maximize:
πL(k)=ΠL {xL(k),(n − 1)h[x(k)],k} − f(k) − F







= f0(k)( 7 )
where the second term on the left hand side represents the strategic incentive to commit
to k.
16 T h es i g no ft h i si n c e n t i v ei st h eo p p o s i t eo ft h es i g no fΠ12ΠL
13.H e n c e , w e
have the following traditional result: under barriers to entry: 1) when the leader is
tough (ΠL
13 > 0), strategic over (under)-investment occurs under SS (SC), inducing
a “top dog” (“puppy dog”) strategy; 2) when the leader is soft (ΠL
13 < 0), strategic
under (over)-investment occurs under SS (SC), inducing a “lean and hungry” (“fat
cat”) strategy.
The intuition behind this result is important for what follows. Basically, under
SS the leader gains from committing to an aggressive behaviour in the market and
can accomplish such a task by overinvesting or underinvesting strategically when the
investment promotes aggressive or accommodating behaviour. Otherwise, under SC
the leader tries to commit to accommodating behaviour in the market and can achieve
this by adopting the opposite kind of strate g y .T h eu l t i m a t eb e h a v i o u ro ft h el e a d e r
in the market depends on whether strategies are substitutes or complements.
I will now consider the case of endogenous entry assuming that the number of











is positive by the assumption of the stability of the system.
30of active ﬁrms, n.
17 The equilibrium conditions in the second stage for a given pre-
liminary investment k are the optimality conditions derived before and the zero proﬁt
condition for the followers:
Π
£
x,(n − 2)h(x)+h(xL),¯ k
¤
= F (8)
We can now prove that a change in the strategic commitment by the leader does
not aﬀect the equilibrium strategies of the other ﬁrms, but it reduces their equilibrium
number. Let us use the fact that βL = β + h(x) − h(xL) to rewrite the three










1 [xL,β+ h(x) − h(xL),k]=0
This system is block recursive and stable under the condition ΠL
11 −h0(xL)ΠL
12 < 0.
The ﬁrst two equations provide the equilibrium values for the strategy of the followers
and their spillovers, x and β, which are independent of k, while the last equation









R 0f o r ΠL
13 R 0( 9 )
In the ﬁrst stage the optimal choice of investment k for the leader maximizes:
πL(k)=ΠL {xL(k),β+ h(x) − h[xL(k)],k} − f(k) − F










w h e r et h es i g no ft h es e c o n dt e r mi sj u s tt h es i g no fΠL
13. This implies that the leader
has a positive strategic incentive to invest when it is tough (ΠL
13 > 0) and a negative
one when it is soft.
Since our focus is on the strategic incentive to invest, I will normalize the proﬁt
functions in such a way that, in absence of strategic motivations, the leader would
choose k = ¯ k resulting in a symmetric situation with the other ﬁrms.
18 Consequently
we can conclude that a tough leader overinvests compared to the other ﬁrms, in the
sense that k>¯ k, while a soft leader underinvests. We also noticed that a tough leader
is made more aggressive by overinvesting and a soft leader is made more aggressive by
underinvesting. Finally, the strategy of the other ﬁrms is independent of the investment
of the leader. Hence, we can conclude that the leader will be always more aggressive
in the market than any other ﬁrm. Summarizing, we have:






= f0(¯ k). Such a normalization does not aﬀect qualitatively the
incentives to adopt strategic investments and has a realistic motivation. We can imagine that
all ﬁrms choose k but only the leader can do it before the others and commit to it, hence only
a strategic motivation can induce the leader to choose a diﬀerent investment.
31Under Nash competition with endogenous entry, when the strategic investment
makes the leader tough (soft), over (under)-investment occurs, but the leader is always
more aggressive than the other ﬁrms.
Basically, under free entry, the taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) boils
down to two simple kinds of investment and an unambiguous aggressive behaviour in
the market: whenever ΠL
13 > 0, it is always optimal to adopt a “top dog” strategy
with overinvestment in the ﬁrst stage so as to be aggressive in the second stage; while
when ΠL
13 < 0 we always have a “lean and hungry” look with underinvestment, but
the behaviour in the second stage is still aggressive. Strategic investment is always
used as a commitment to be more aggressive in a market with free entry, and this does
not depend on the kind of competition or strategic interaction between the ﬁrms. As
we will see in the applications of the next section, the result is particularly drastic for
markets with price competition. In these markets, leaders are accommodating in the
presence of entry barriers (choosing higher prices than their competitors), but they are
aggressive under free entry (choosing lower prices). This diﬀerence may be useful for
empirical research on barriers to entry and may have crucial implications for anti-trust
policy.
Applications
We will now apply the above results to a number of basic industrial organiza-
tion situations, with particular reference to speciﬁc features of markets of the New
Economy: R&D investments, network externalities and bundling issues.
R&D Investments
Our ﬁrst application is to a standard situation where a ﬁrm can adopt preliminary
R&D investments to improve its production technology and hence reduce its cost
function. Traditional results on the opportunity of these investments for market leaders
are ambiguous when the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, but, as I will show, they are not
when entry is endogenous. From now on, I will assume for simplicity that marginal
costs are constant. Here, the leader can invest k and reduce its marginal cost to
c(k) > 0 with c0(k) < 0, while the marginal cost is constant for all the other ﬁrms.
Consider ﬁrst a model of quantity competition. The gross proﬁto ft h el e a d e r
becomes:
ΠL (xL,β L,k)=xLp(xL,β L) − c(k)xL (11)
Notice that in such a model, ΠL
12 has an ambiguous sign, but ΠL
13 = −c0(k) > 0,
hence the leader may overinvest or underinvest in R&D under barriers to entry, but,
will always overinvest in R&D and produce more than the other ﬁrms when entry is
free. For instance assuming inverse demand p = a −
P
xi with c(k)=c − dk and











while all entrants produce x =
√
F (while for a large enough d the leader would invest
more to deter entry and to remain alone in the market).
Consider now the model of price competition where the leader can invest to reduce
















L > 0. Hence, underinvestment in R&D emerges when there
are barriers to entry, but overinvestment is optimal when there is free entry. Whenever
entry is endogenous, the leader wants to improve its cost function to be more aggressive
in the market by selling its good at a lower price. Summarizing, we have:
19
Under both quantity and price competition with endogenous entry, a ﬁrm has
always an incentive to overinvest in R&D to reduce costs and to be more aggressive
than the others in the market.
Network externalities
Consider now dynamic models where proﬁtability depends on past strategies. Net-
work externalities imply that demand is enhanced by past production and the conse-
quent diﬀusion of the product across customers. This may be the case of the markets
for operatying systems and general softwares (Microsoft), computers (IBM, Hewlett
Packard) or wireless and broadband communications (Nokia, Motorola).
In these contexts it is natural to think in terms of quantity competition and, for
simplicity, following Bulow et al. (1985), I will focus on two period models with the
leader alone in the market in the ﬁrst period and facing free entry in the second
period. In case of demand externalities the leader will overproduce initially to create
network eﬀects, which broadly matches pricing strategies by leaders in high tech sectors
characterized by network externalities.
To formalize these results in the simplest setting, assume perfectly substitute
goods. Imagine that in the ﬁrst period the leader produces k facing the inverse demand
p(k) and a marginal cost c. In the second period other ﬁrms compete in quantities and
the leader faces the inverse demand p(xL + βL)φ(k) where φ(k) is some increasing
function of past production, which is a measure of the diﬀusion of the product across
consumers (and induces the network externality). The proﬁt function for the leader
becomes:
19Welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but in this case one can show that
a leadership improves the allocation of resources. This is not due only to the cost reduction
but also to the reduction in the number of ﬁrms since, as well known, Cournot and Bertrand
equilibria with free entry are characterized by excessive entry.
33ΠL (xL,β L,k)=kp(k) − ck + δ [p(xL + βL)φ(k) − c]xL (13)
where δ<1 is the discount factor. In this case in equilibrium we have ΠL
13 =
δφ0(k)/cφ(k) > 0 which already suggests that the initial monopolist will overproduce
to be more aggressive when the market opens up. Moreover, the choice of initial
production will satisfy:
p(k)+kp0(k)=c − δxLpφ0(k) − δxLcφ0(k)/φ(k)
which equates marginal revenue to eﬀective marginal cost. The latter includes the
myopic marginal cost c, a second term which represents the direct beneﬁtd u et ot h e
network eﬀects on future demand and a last term representing the indirect (strategic)
beneﬁts due to the commitment to adopt a more aggressive strategy in the future.
Summarizing:
Under network externalities a ﬁrm has always an incentive to overproduce initially
so as to be more aggressive when endogenous entry takes place in the future.
Notice that the leader may engage in dumping (pricing below marginal cost) in the
ﬁrst period (if the discount factor is large enough), but this may well be beneﬁcial to
consumers in both periods (see Economides, 2001, for a related analysis of the software
market).
Bundling
There has been a lot of attention in the economic literature on the rationale for
bundling products rather than selling them separately. A fundamental reason for this
is that many antitrust cases have focused on such a practice as an anti-competitive
device. This paper tries to derive some general results on why ﬁrms bundle their
products and some welfare implications.
According to the traditional leverage theory of tied good sales, monopolists would
bundle their products with others for competitive or partially competitive markets to
extend their monopolistic power. Such a view as been criticized by the Chicago school
because it would erroneously claim that a ﬁrm can artiﬁcially increase monopolistic
proﬁts from a competitive market. Bundling should have diﬀerent motivations, as
price discrimination or creation of joint economies, whose welfare consequences are
ambiguous and sometimes even positive.
Whinston (1990) has changed the terms of the discussion trying to verify how
a monopolist can aﬀect strategic interaction with competitors in another market by
bundling. His main ﬁnding is that the only reason why a monopolist could bundle
is to deter entry (as in Dixit, 1980), which has typically negative eﬀects on welfare.
His analysis is based on price competition between two ﬁrms, hence strategic com-
plementarity holds, and it can be extended in many directions, especially including
complementarities between products.
We depart from this analysis and consider a more general model where there may
be more ﬁrms and alternative market structures. In particular, under free entry,
34bundling may become the optimal aggressive strategy. In this case, bundling does
not need to have an exclusionary purpose as assumed by the leverage theory, and the
reduction in the price of the two bundled goods together can also beneﬁtc o n s u m e r s .
Such an analysis may apply to the bundling of Windows with Internet Explorer and
Media Player at no extra price (see Economides, 2001), which, nevertheless, has been
harshly treated by the US and EU antitrust authorities.
To make our point in a neat way, let us follow the example by Whinston (1990),
who has shown that a monopolist in one market does not have incentives to bundle
its product with another one sold in a duopolistic market (unless this deters entry in
the latter), and that this corresponds to a “puppy dog” (accomodating) strategy (see
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984). However, under free entry, bundling may become the
optimal “top dog” (aggressive) strategy.
Imagine that a monopolistic market is characterized by zero costs of production
and unitary demand at price v, which corresponds to the valuation of the good. For
simplicity, there are no complementarities with a good produced in another market
which is characterized by standard price competition, a ﬁxed cost F and a constant
marginal cost c.
Gross proﬁts for the monopolist without bundling are:
ΠM (pM,β M)=v +( pM − c)D(pM,β M) − F (14)
while proﬁts for the other ﬁrms are Πi (pi,β i)=( pi − c)D(pi,β i)−F.I nB e r t r a n d
equilibrium with free entry the monopolist enjoys just the proﬁts ΠM = v.
Under bundling, demand for the monopolist is constrained by demand for the
other good, which is assumed less than unitary. Given a bundle price corresponding
to PM = v + pM,p r o ﬁts for the monopolist become ΠMB =( PM − c)D(PM −
v,βM)=( pM + v − c)D(pM,β M), while the other ﬁrms have the same objective
function as before. In Bertrand equilibrium the monopolist chooses the price PM
satisfying:
(pM + v − c)D1 [pM,(n − 1)g(p)] + D[pM,(n − 1)g(p)] = 0 (15)
while each one of the other ﬁrms chooses p satisfying:
(p − c)D1 [p,g(pM)+( n − 2)g(p)] + D[p,g(pM)+( n − 2)g(p)] = 0 (16)
If endogenous entry holds, the number of ﬁrms satisﬁes also:
(p − c)D[p,g(pM)+( n − 2)g(p)] = F (17)
so that the proﬁt of the monopolist becomes:
ΠMB =( pM + v − c)D[pM,(n − 1)g(p)]
Notice that if we deﬁne β = g(pM)+( n − 2)g(p) the equilibrium spillovers re-
ceived by the entrants as a consequence of the price chosen by their competitors, the
35equilibrium conditions jointly determine the price of the entrants p and β indepen-
dently from the price of the monopolist. Hence, using βM = β + g(p) − g(pM) we
can rewrite the equilibrium ﬁrst order condition of the monopolist as an implicit ex-
pression for pM = pM(v), and it is immediate to derive that the equilibrium price
of the secondary good decided by the monopolist has to be decreasing in v.
20 As
well known from the theory of market leaders (Etro, 2006a), even under price compe-
tition, any strategic commitment is undertaken with the aim of being aggressive on
the market. Nevertheless, when v is small enough, the equilibrium does not imply
exclusion of other ﬁrms. Clearly, if the proﬁt in the primary market is large enough,
the monopolist may ﬁnd convenient to oﬀer such a large discount on the bundle that
all its competitors will have to exit the market, but this only happens under retrictive
conditions.
Clearly bundling is optimal if ΠMB > ΠM, and we need to verify under which
conditions this happens. The ﬁrst element to take in consideration is the way in which
bundling changes the strategy of the monopolist. Since ΠMB
1 − ΠM
1 = vD1 < 0,
bundling makes the monopolist tough. This implies that the monopolist is led to
reduce the eﬀective price in the other market by choosing a low price of the bundle.
Since strategic complementarity holds, a price decrease by the monopolist induces
the other ﬁrms to decrease their prices. Under barriers to entry, as in the Whinston
(1990) model with two ﬁrms, this reduces proﬁts of all ﬁrms in the other market, hence
bundling is never optimal unless it manages to deter entry.
Under free entry, however, result can change: bundling can now be an eﬀective
device to outplace some of the other ﬁrms without deterring entry but creating some
proﬁts for the monopolist in the other market through an aggressive strategy. In
particular, bundling is optimal if the low price of the bundle increases proﬁts in the
competitive market more than it reduces them in the monopolistic one. It is easy to
verify that bundling is optimal if:
(pM − c)D[pM,(n − 1)g(p)] − F>v {1 − D[pM,(n − 1)g(p)]}
w h o s el e f th a n ds i d ei st h eg a i ni np r o ﬁts in the competitive market and whose right
hand side is the loss in proﬁts in the monopolistic market.
Moreover, in this case, bundling does not need to have an exclusionary purpose as
assumed by the leverage theory of tied good sales. The reduction in the price of the
two bundled goods together can also beneﬁt consumers. This is even more likely when
they are complements.
Bundling is an example of a discrete strategy: a ﬁrm either bundle two goods or
not. A similar story can be used to evaluate a related discrete strategy, the choice of




−D1 [pM,β+ g(p) − g(pM)]
∆
< 0
where ∆ ≡ 2D1 +( pM + v − c)[D11 − g0(pM)D12] − g0(pM)D2 < 0 by the stability of the
equilibrium system. In other words, the price of the bundle increases less than proportionally
with v or the monopolist oﬀers the bundle with a discount on the secondary good compared
to its competitors.
36product compatibility and system compatibility, or interoperability: as Tirole (1988,
p. 335) has correctly noticed, “a manufacturer that makes its system incompatible
with other systems imposes a de facto tie-in.” Typically product compatibility softens
price competition because consumers can mix and match products of diﬀerent ﬁrms:
these products endogenously become complement, while they would be substitutes in
case of incompatibility. Since price cuts are more proﬁtable when competing products
are substitutes rather than complements, interoperability softens price competition
(Matutes and Regibeau, 1988).
H e n c e ,a c c o r d i n gt ot h es t a n d a r do u t c o m e under price competition with an exoge-
nous number of competitors, the only reason why a leader would choose a low level
of interoperability would be to induce their exit from the market. On the contrary, if
entry in the market is endogenous, a leader would always favour a low level of inter-
operability for a diﬀerent purpose than entry deterrence: just because this strategy
would strenghten price competition and enhance the gains from a low pricing strategy
in the system competition, that is the competition between alternative systems. This
may shed some light on the reason for which market leaders as IBM or Microsoft have
been often accused by their competitors of limiting interoperability with their prod-
ucts: followers typically dislike strategies that strenghten price competition and like
strategies that soften price competition.
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